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Abstract
Current enterprise systems rely heavily on the modelling
and enactment of business processes. One of the key cri-
teria for a business process is to represent not just the
behaviours of the participants but also how the contrac-
tual relationships among them evolve over the course of
an interaction. In this paper we provide a framework in
which one can define policies/ business rules using de-
ontic assignments to represent the contractual relation-
ships. To achieve this end we use a combination of de-
ontic/normative concepts like proclamation, directed obli-
gation and direct action to account for a deontic theory
of commitment which in turn can be used to model busi-
ness processes in their organisational settings. In this way
we view a business process as a social interaction process
for the purpose of doing business. Further, we show how
to extend the i∗ framework, a well known organisational
modelling technique, so as to accommodate our notion of
deontic dependency.
Keywords: Business, Enterprise and Process modelling.
1 Introduction
One of the issues which was heavily debated dur-
ing the panel discussions of AAMAS-04 (Singh 2004)
was with regard to considering business process mod-
elling/management as a killer application for agents. It
was decided that in-order to make progress in this direc-
tion it was inevitable to characterise problems within busi-
ness process modelling/management where agents can ap-
ply. In this paper we make such a move whereby we con-
sider an agent to represent a real world business partner
with its own local business rules and configurations. The
collaboration between the different partners is made pos-
sible through normative co-ordination, i.e., the idea that
agents can achieve flexible co-ordination by conferring
normative positions like duties, permissions and powers
to other agents. In this way we can view the partners
involved in a business scenario as multiple agents who
might collaborate by creating commitments using norma-
tive concepts such as obligation, proclamation and so on
but at the same time retain their autonomy. This in a
way is similar to how a Multi-Agent System (MAS) is de-
fined using abstractions like team and commitments from
the perspective of organisations and societies (Conte &
Dellarocas 2001, Pitt 2005).
The definition of a business process we adopt in this
paper is more general in the sense that we consider a
business process as a special kind of social interaction
process. A social interaction process is a temporally
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ordered, coherent set of events and actions, involving
one or more communication acts that may create com-
mitments, perceieved and performed by agents, and fol-
lowing a set of rules, or protocol, that is governed by
norms, and that specifies the type of the interaction pro-
cess (Wagner 2003).
Based on the above definition of a business process, we
develop a logical framework based on multi-modal logic
to capture the normative positions among agents in an or-
ganisational setting. We do not take into account any tem-
poral considerations in this work as it remains part of fu-
ture work. Also commitment is not taken as a primitive
but is rather defined in terms of directed obligations, i.e.,
an agent’s obligation towards another agent. For exam-
ple, the obligation to pay for delivered goods is directed,
so to say from the buyer to the seller in a business situ-
ation like trade where different agents like buyer, seller,
transport company, customs offices etc. exist. The rea-
sons for not adopting commitments as a primitive is that
(1) we want to show that deontic logic can be used to
capture an agents obligation to another and (2) thereby
show that the argument made in (Singh, Chopra, Desai &
Mallya 2004) which states that commitments fare better
than traditional deontic logic because deontic logic dis-
regards an agents obligation to another agent is not true.
Two other important concepts we use in our framework
are that of proclamation and direct action. Proclamation
is seen as a particular type of speech-act (communication
act) that helps the agents to create normative positions in-
volving other agents. It is similar to the role speech acts
play in language-action approaches to work-flowmanage-
ment as given in (Goldkuhl 1996). Proclamation is used
to cover all those speech acts by which an agent makes
a statement expressing a certain proposition with the aim
of making the proposition true. In other words, different
types of speech acts like directives (permitting, requesting,
forbidding etc.), Commissives (agreeing, offering, promis-
ing etc.), Constatives (announcing, disagreeing, informing
etc.) etc. are considered as instances of just one speech
act like proclamation. The advantage of this approach is
that one need to worry only about the specific semantics
corresponding to the proclamation operator rather than for
each type of speech act. On the other hand direct action is
concerned with relationships between agents and states of
affairs they want to realise/bring about. We discuss more
about these in the coming sections.
Let us put together the different concepts explained
above with the help of a an example. Consider the work-
flow in Figure 1. depicting a simple scenario of managing
after sales service.
This process is assumed to execute in a technology
which represents a shared space between various business
partners and stake-holders of the overall business process.
The 4 actors (roles) within the scenario are that of Cus-
tomer, Retailer, Manufacturer and Technician. In such a
set up it is natural to think of commitments as being made
from one actor to another to achieve some goal and these
commitments could be in the form of obligations. For ex-
Figure 1: After sales service work-flow
ample, Send work request to technician and Contact Cus-
tomer are two activities which may be allocated to either
the retailer or the manufacturer depending on the partic-
ular instance. Sending request to technician may involve
an internal activity of first finding the most appropriate
technician. For instance, the retailer/manufacturer is nor-
mally obliged to issue several RFQs (Request For Quote)
to several technicians and choose from among them. The
reason is that the retailer/manufacturer wants to get the
best quote. The technicians are obliged to respond to an
RFQ because it represents a potential business that he/she
needs. Hence we can say that a particular technician t un-
dertakes an obligation towards the retailer/manufacturer to
perform job j while the retailer/manufacturer undertakes
towards the technician the obligation of paying the price
p. Such obligations are called directed obligations and
we explain more about their logical properties in section
2. In this way we can define commitments in terms of di-
rected obligations from one party to another. In general,
if we have two actors (roles) representing a debtor and
the other a creditor in a particular exchange relationship
it is natural to think of a commitment as a directed obli-
gation from the debtor to the creditor regarding a partic-
ular condition that in effect the debtor promises to bring
about. It is also the case that the different actors could
have reciprocal obligations whereby they can make effec-
tive contractual relationships/joint commitments between
them. We show how a combination of notions related to
obligation, proclamation and action accounts for a deon-
tic theory of commitment which in turn can be used to
model business processes in their organisational settings.
Not only does such a model enable to describe and analyse
commitments that exist between the actors of a problem
domain but also helps to achieve coherent behaviour in in-
teraction processes. We achieve this by defining various
operations that can be performed to create and manipulate
commitments that would help the different actors involved
to create various normative relations needed to co-ordinate
their behaviours for the overall success of a business pro-
cess. In this way, similar to (Taveter & Wagner 2001a),
we view a business process as a social interaction process
for the purpose of doing business.
Our deontic approach to process mod-
elling/management is based on works like (Barbuceanu,
Gray & Mankovski 1999, Taveter & Wagner 2001a, Yu
& Mylopoulos 1993, Yu & Mylopoulos 1994) where it
is often argued that organisations are made up of social
actors who have goals and interests which they pursue
through a network of relationships with other actors1.
Hence a richer model of business process should include
not only how work products (entities) progress from
process step to process step (activities) but also how
the actors performing these steps relate to each other
intentionally, i.e., in terms of concepts such as goal,
belief, commitment etc.. Such process models conveys
a deeper understanding of a business process by focus
sing on the intentional dependencies among actors which
is extremely important for modelling business processes
between enterprises that consists of the steps of analysis
and design. Following this paradigm, in this work,
we develop a formal representation based on a deontic
approach to capture the normative dependencies between
the different actors in a business process scenario. The
formal representation allows us to achieve coherent
behaviour in the interaction process where the rules of
engagement are dynamically and frequently changing.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we
outline the various ingredients of our logical framework
needed to represent the different aspects involved in a so-
cial interaction process (business process). In section 3
we propose our theory of commitment based on a combi-
nation of proclamation, obligation and direct action. The
next section (section 4) demonstrates an example scenario
in which we show our working model. Section 5 shows
some general rules of engagement between different ac-
tors in an organisational setting. Section 6 makes a com-
parison of our model with that of i∗ and extends the later to
accomodate normative dependency. Section 7 talks about
related as well as future work.
2 Institutional Agency
As mentioned in the previous section business processes
exist in social organisational settings wherein interaction
between agents takes place in a social context. Hence
normative concepts are essential for understanding and
controlling coherent interaction between agents and other
systems. For this paper we take as background the
well-known Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn (Kanger 1972, Lindahl
1977, Po¨rn 1977) logical theory to account for agency and
organised interaction (see (Elgesem 1997)). Our start-
ing point is to take advantage of some recent contri-
butions (Santos, Jones & Carmo 1997, Jones & Sergot
1996, Pitt 2005), which have enriched this framework
with some substantial refinements. As we have alluded
to, the notion of agency is described in a multi-modal
logical setting. Despite some well-known limitations
(see (Elgesem 1997, Royakkers 2000)), such an approach
is very general since actions are simply taken to be rela-
tionships between agents and states of affairs, and very
flexible since it allows for the easy combination of ac-
tions and concepts like powers, obligations, beliefs, etc. It
also permits to provide a simple conceptual analysis of the
structure of organisations of agents. As recently pointed
out regarding the design of computerised multi-agent sys-
tems, such a multi-modal logic “[is] a means of supplying
an intermediate level of description, falling somewhere
between [. . . ] ordinary-language account of what a sys-
tem [. . . ] is supposed to be able to do and [. . . ] the level
of implementation” (Pitt 2005).
1We use the term agent/actor interchangeably.
2.1 The Logical Framework
We first provide the basic ingredients that make up a the-
ory of institutional agency and later show how a notion of
commitments can be captured by combining these basic
ingredients. We start with the idea of personal and direct
action to realise a state of affairs, formalised by the modal
operator E: ExA means that the agent x brings it about
that A. For example, suppose that A represents a situation
in Figure(1) where a particular technician, t1, can do the
maintenance job on a specific date. Then it could be that
the retailer r brings it about that A by sending a request to
the technician t1. Different axiomatisations have been pro-
vided for E but almost all include the following schemas.
ExA→ A (1)
(1) is recognised as valid by almost all theories of agency.
It is nothing but the usual axiom T of modal logic, and it
expresses the successfulness of actions that is behind the
common reading of “bring about” concept. We reformu-
late this axiom as EXA→ A to represent a set of agents
X . E{x} = Ex when the set of agents is a singleton. ExA
can have the form ExsendGoods(p), (where A is an ac-
tion predicate denoting a specific action), meaning agent
x sends the goods p. Here agent x executes by itself the
action A. Most of the examples in this paper interprets A
as an action predicate. It should be noted that this gen-
eral approach to the treatment of action does not take into
consideration state change and temporal dimension and is
focused only on the agent concerned and the states of af-
fairs that result from his/her actions. It is not a drawback
as far as this work is concerned because when specifying
rules/policies for normative co-ordination in an organisa-
tional setting where multiple actors are involved, it may be
that only the end result together with which actors brings
it about is important.
One other axiom advanced in (Santos et al. 1997) –
and adopted here– to characterise specifically the action
operator E is
ExEyA→¬ExA (2)
which corresponds to the idea that the brings-it-about op-
erator expresses actions performed directly and person-
ally. Compared to ExA which pertains to individual agent
positions ExEyA denotes interpersonal control positions
and it is this ability to iterate action operators that could
be seen as a benefit for having a general theory of ac-
tion. From a process point of view the above axiom states
a principle of rationality for modelling co-ordination be-
tween different actors in a process model. For instance,
such an axiom can be used to show that an actor x dele-
gates an actor y to bring about a condition. It is counterin-
tuitive that the same agent brings it about that A and brings
it about that somebody else achieves A.
2.2 Obligation
Our logical framework incorporates obligations. We useO
as a directed deontic operator indexed by a set of agents to
represent obligation. We writeOxE{y}A to mean that agent
y has towards agent x the obligation of realising A. As in
the case of E we need to sketch a suitable axiomatisation
for O. We cannot use Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) for
this purpose as it has been shown in (Royakkers 2000) that
SDL is not adequate for combining deontic and action op-
erators. The reason is that SDL supports the following
implications which is not acceptable from a process mod-
elling view point
OyExA→ OyA (3)
OzExEyA→ OzEyA (4)
For instance, let x be a retailer, y a customer and A
is the condition sendGoods. Then the retailers obliga-
tion towards the customer to bring about the condition
sendGoods should not entail that sendGoods is in general
obligatory. Similarly in the case of the second implication
suppose that we have a scenario where in addition to the
retailer and customer a manufacturer z is also involved and
A is the condition buyProduct. Now the retailers obliga-
tion towards the manufacturer to bring about the condition
that the customer buys a particular product does not entail
that the customer has a personal obligation to the manu-
facturer to buy that product. To avoid the above problems
we only consider the following axioms for a logic of obli-
gation
(OxA∧OxB)→ Ox(A∧B) (5)
OxA→¬Ox¬A (6)
2.3 Proclamation
The link between speech acts theory and normative po-
sitions has been under investigation for some time now
(cf. (Jones 1990, Castelfranchi, Dignum, Catholijn &
Treur 2000, Singh 1999, Colombetti 2000)). (Gelati, Ro-
tolo, Sartor & Governatori 2004) defines proclamation as
a special type of speech act (communication act) dealing
with all those acts by which a subject makes a statement
expressing a certain proposition and this statement has the
function of making this proposition true. In this way it
can be seen as a see-to-it-that modality indirectly repre-
senting a speech act and can be formalised by the modal
operator proc. As for E, proc will be indexed by sets of
agents and therefore procXA means that the members of
x jointly proclaim A. As before when X has only one
element x, procXA means that A is proclaimed person-
ally by x. Its logic is characterised by some very mini-
mal properties: it is closed under logical equivalence, i.e.,
A≡ B→ procA≡ procB and includes at least the axiom
(procxA∧procxB)≡ procx(A∧B). (7)
Of course, proc is not necessarily successful. Whether it
is successful or not, within an organisational setting s, de-
pends on whether s makes it effective by means of appro-
priate counts-as rules. We talk more about the counts-as
rule in the next section.
Since we define commitments in terms of directed obli-
gation and commitments typically arise from certain com-
munication acts, we can use proc to model a communica-
tion act through which a particular agent conveys his/her
obligation towards another. For example in the scenario
depicted in Figure1 procr(OtE{r}A), conveys a commu-
nication act made by the retailer (r) meaning that the re-
tailer is obligated towards the technician (t) to bring about
a certain condition, for instance to pay a specific amount
of money. This proclamation by r could be seen as r’s
attempt to commit itself towards t. In a similar manner
to model a communication act expressing a joint commit-
ment between two parties involved we can use proc{x,y}.
We discuss more about joint commitments in the coming
sections. Also, as we have observed, proclamations are
not necessarily effective in the sense that when an agent x
proclaims that A, x brings it about that A is dependent on
the concerned organisation. In the next section we show
how we can achieve this result.
2.4 The counts-as Rule
In the previous sections we described the main ingredients
needed to develop a theory of institutional agency. The
intuition behind such an exercise was to show how agent-
oriented approaches to normative agency can be used in
the domain of process modelling/management. But we
need some more material to complete the picture. We need
a way to express that certain facts hold in the context of an
institution. For instance, it is normal in a norm-governed
institution that designated agents are empowered to create
institutional facts2 by performing certain types of actions.
Hence each organisation needs rules about which agents
are empowered to assign rights, or to alter existing rights.
Such power assignment rules can often be represented us-
ing a counts-as structure to denote the context in which
they operate. In a business process scenario this is impor-
tant as the context denotes a group that contains the partic-
ipating agents usually in different roles thereby enabling
the user to specify those rules that count as effective in a
particular context. We represent this contextual structure
using a conditional connective,⇒s, to express the counts
as connection in an institution s. It should be noted that
this conditional connective is used just as a symbol of rep-
resentation and has got nothing to do with the formalism
developed in Jones and Sergot (Jones & Sergot 1996). The
intuition behind the above definition of the counts-as link
is that we want to capture the idea that counts-as rules may
specify when an institutional act (e.g., a contract made by
person x in the name of person y) has the same effects of
another institutional act (e.g., a contract made by y).
Another nice feature of the counts-as rule is in its abil-
ity to express various forms of normative delegation when
combined with proc. Since proc is not successful, its ef-
fectiveness is provided by the institution assuming rules
such as
procxA⇒s ExA. (8)
Such a combination can be used to capture two forms of
delegation such as
procy(procxA)⇒s Ey(procxA) (9)
procy(ExA)⇒s Ey(ExA) (10)
where the proclamation or the action of y count as the
proclamation or the action of somebody else. (9) conveys
the meaning that when y proclaims that x proclaims that A,
this counts as ymaking so that x proclaims that A (here x is
the principal and y is the representative). For example,De-
termine Warranty type in Figure(1) is an automated activ-
ity which interprets the conditions of the after sales service
agreement and appropriately routes the subsequent activ-
ities to the correct process role (retailer or manufacturer).
There can be a condition in the agreement which states
that if the purchase is made in the last 12 months, then the
warranty will be covered by the manufacturer. However,
the retailer provides extended warranty services, and if the
problem is reported in the second or third year of the pur-
chase, then the retailer will provide the maintenance ser-
vice. Consider a particular situation in our scenario where
the retailer r represents the manufacturer m with respect
to informing the customer c that if the purchase is made
in the last 12 months then the warranty will be covered by
the manufacturer. This could be seen as a proclamation
from the manufacturer denoting a business policy he/she
follows to do business. We can formally define this policy
as
procm(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear))) (11)
where (OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear))) is the content of
the manufacturer’s proclamation denoting his/her obliga-
tion to the customer to cover warranty for the first year.
Hence (9) can be reformulated as
procr(procm(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear))))⇒s
Er(procm(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear)))) (12)
Therefore as far as c is concerned with the reading that r’s
proclamation about m’s business policy that c’s warranty
will be covered by m for the first 12 months counts as r’s
making so that m proclaims the policy.
2For a distinction between social facts and institutional facts refer (Taveter &
Wagner 2001a).
Let us see how such rules of delegation gets used
in our scenario. Suppose that (12) is a business rule3
representing certain conditions of the after sales service
agreement. Once Create Customer Request, Figure(1), is
performed by the customer using the designated service
available through the portal it is up-to Determine War-
ranty Type to interpret conditions of the after sales ser-
vice agreement and route subsequent activities accord-
ingly. We will see how the conditions/constraints in
rules like (12) gets interpreted/reasoned about. From
Er(procm(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear)))) (the conse-
quent of (12)) and (1) we get
(procm(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear))). (13)
Similarly from (13) and (8) we get
Em(OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear))) (14)
Again by applying (1) to (14) we get
OcEm(coverWarranty(1styear)) (15)
conveying that the manufacturer is obliged to the customer
to cover warranty for the first year and accordingly De-
termine Warranty Type will route further activities to the
manufacturer if the customer request states that his/her
purchase was done in the last 12 months. More complex
constraints can be easily added to such rules as we show
later in this paper. Also, our choice of the consequent part
of (12) was arbitrary as we would get the same result with
the antecedent too.
A representation like (10) is necessary when the repre-
sentative substitutes a principal which would not be able
to perform directly the activity delegated to the represen-
tative. Also when applied to action descriptions, formulas
like
ExA⇒s ExB (16)
ExA⇒s EyB (17)
represent respectively x’s institutional power to produce B
when A is realised and x’s power to perform an action as
if something else were made by y (see (Jones & Sergot
1996)).
The last notion we have to deal with is that of Declar-
ative power. The concept of declarative power is common
in many normative systems and consists in the capacity
of the power-holder of creating institutional facts, simply
by “proclaiming” them. But as pointed out earlier, procla-
mations are not necessarily effective and when an institu-
tion provides for the effectiveness of a proclamation we
say that the subject of the proclamation has a declarative
power. The following definition holds
DeclPow{x}A=de f proc{x}A⇒ E{x}A (18)
conveying the meaning that an agent x has the declarative
power of producing A means that if x proclaims that A
then x produces A. In a similar manner to show that every
couple of actors has the power of establishing any obliga-
tion between them simply by proclaiming it we have the
following representation
DeclPow{x,y}(OyE{x}A) (19)
3 Commitments via Proclamation, Obligation and
Direct Action
In the previous sections we outlined various constructs
needed for a theory of normative agency. In this section
3Business rules are statements that express (certain parts of) a business policy,
defining business terms, and defining or constraining the operations of an enter-
prise (Taveter & Wagner 2001a).
we show how combining these different concepts we can
arrive at a notion of commitment which is needed to ef-
fectively form a contract between two participating enti-
ties in a business scenario. In (Singh 1999, Yolum &
Singh 2004) commitment is treated as first-class abstract
objects where a base level commitment is represented as a
four-place relation, C(x,y,G, p), denoting a commitment
from x toward y to bring about a condition p in the context
of G. Here x is the agent who is committed (debtor) and y
is the agent who receives the commitment (creditor). We
could express this in our formalisation by a two step pro-
cess without taking commitment as a primitive as follows,
OyE{x}p (20)
with the reading that x is obliged to y to bring it about p.
In order to show the commitment aspect we combine proc
with the directed deontic operators above to give us
proc{x}(OyE{x}p) (21)
Here, the proclamation is x’s attempt to commit itself to-
wards y and thereby makes x responsible to y for satis-
fying p. For a stronger version of commitment we need
to provide (21) with some additional support. It has been
pointed out in (Gelati et al. 2004) that proclamations are
not necessarily effective in the sense that when an agent x
proclaims that p, x brings it about that p only if the insti-
tution provides for this result. But this is not a problem in
our set up as we can give a rule like
proc{x}p⇒SCM E{x}p (22)
which conveys the meaning that in the context of Supply
Chain Management (SCM) x’s proclamation of p counts
as x brings it about p. For example, let x denote a supplier,
y a customer and p denote a condition like sendGoods(p).
Then from (21) and (22) we get the reading that, in the
context of an SCM, the supplier’s proclamation regarding
his/her obligation towards the customer to bring about the
act of sending goods counts as the supplier bringing about
the act. In other words the supplier’s proclamation regard-
ing his/her commitment towards the customer counts as
the supplier realising those commitments. Hence the sup-
plier’s commitment towards the customer to send goods
results in sending the goods. This formalisation also goes
well with the commonsensical view that commitments to
other agents represent commitments to oneself to bring it
about. In a business process scenario like SCM, (21) and
(22) could be seen as policies that govern the commitment
operations among different stakeholders and are part of the
contractual relationships existing between them. They are
considered as policies as they differ from the local busi-
ness rules and configurations that make up a particular
partner in a business scenario. In a similar manner (23)
shows x’s attempt to command y and (24) conveys x’s at-
tempt to free itself from an obligation towards y.
proc{x}(OxE{y}p) (23)
proc{x}(¬OyE{x}p) (24)
3.1 Commitments Through Reciprocal Obligations
In the previous section we saw how a proclamation by
a single agent, where a combination of directed obliga-
tion and action is involved, could account for base-level
commitments of the type C(x,y,G, p). But as pointed out
in (Gelati et al. 2004) there could be multi-lateral pro-
claims within an institution where a set of agents is in-
volved in a proclamation with reciprocal obligations as the
content of the proclamation. We use such proclamations
to substitute the conditional commitments as proposed
in (Singh 1999). A conditional commitment CC(x,y, p,q)
denotes that if the condition p is satisfied, x will be com-
mitted to bring about condition q. In other words con-
ditional commitments are useful when an agent wants to
commit only if a certain condition holds or only if the
other party is also willing to make a commitment. In our
case this condition is achieved through a notion of mu-
tual obligation. It is also the case that such proclamations
can be used to denote meta-commitments which in turn
are rules that govern the commitment operations as was
pointed out in (Singh 1999). Reciprocal obligations are
used as the content of such proclamations through which
we capture the meta-commitment idea. Actually, in a busi-
ness process scenario like SCM such joint proclamations
carry more sense. For instance, in an exchange relation-
ship between a supplier (x) and a customer (y), we can
define a commitment between the two parties through a
joint proclamation by combining (21) and (23) as follows;
proc{x,y}(OyE{x}(sendGoods(p))∧
OxE{y}(sendMoney(q))) (25)
The proclamation made in (25) shows the joint commit-
ment between x and y by taking x’s obligation towards y to
send goods p and y’s obligation towards x to send money
q. In other words, there should exist reciprocal obligations
between x and y to create such mutual commitments. Else-
where (Gelati et al. 2004) the term contract is given for
such commitments. It is also the case that a joint procla-
mation like (25) boils down to two further committing acts
of offer and accept where x’s offer to y is based on recipro-
cal obligations between x and y and y accepts this. For in-
stance if x’s offer to y is based on the reciprocal obligation
between x and y that x sendGoods(p) and y sendMoney(q)
and y accepts to it then this counts as making the commit-
ment. Formally,
offer{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))∧
accept{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))⇒SCM
proc{x,{y}(OyE{x}sendGoods(p)∧
OxE{y}sendMoney(q)) (26)
In this way we restrict commitments to the creation of re-
ciprocal obligations. Now as noted in (Gelati et al. 2004)
it is possible to define offer and accept which are basically
committing acts in terms of non committing acts like pro-
posal and agree. For instance
proposal{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q)) =de f
procx(OyE{x}sendGoods(p)∧
OxE{y}sendMoney(q)) (27)
conveys x’s declaration whereby he/she proposes not only
to have an obligation towards y to do sendGoods(p) but
also to command y to do sendMoney(q) (i.e., (21) and
(23)). In similar lines we can show that y agree with x
when x has already made a proclamation in which a spe-
cific contractual content is proposed for y to bring about
and y makes a proclamation to commit itself towards x to
bring about this content.
agree{y},{x}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q)) =
proposal{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))∧
proc{y}(OxE{y}sendMoney(q)) (28)
From the above discussion we can say that an offer takes
place in a business process scenario like SCM when the
following condition is satisfied;
offer{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q)) =
proposal{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))∧
{agree{y},{x},(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))⇒SCM
proc{x,y}(OyE{x}sendGoods(p)∧
OxE{y}sendMoney(q))} (29)
The main idea of (29) is to show how the contractual rela-
tionships among the participants (in this case its between
the supplier and customer) in a business process scenario
like SCM evolve over the course of an interaction. For in-
stance, x’s proposal to y of a specific contractual content
and y’s acceptance of it would create the respective di-
rected obligations between them which in turn leads them
to form mutual obligations and thereby arrive at a joint
commitment. In other words (29) can be seen as a business
policy stating that an offer is made between two stake-
holders when there is a proposal and agreement between
the two wherein there is mutual commitment regarding a
specific contractual content. Such business rules help in
outlining the guidelines and restrictions with respect to
states and processes in an organisation. They are declara-
tive statements describing what has to be done rather than
how to do it. In a similar manner y’s acceptance with re-
gard to a contractual relationship could be given as
accept{y},{x}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q)) =
offer{x},{y}(sendGoods(p),sendMoney(q))∧
proc{y}(OxE{y}sendMoney(q)) (30)
indicating y’s agreement with the contractual content. In
this manner, by applying a small set of operations like pro-
posal, accept etc. on the combination of directed obliga-
tion and action we can represent various contractual re-
lationships of interest in a business scenario. Table 3.1
shows that all the operations defined in (Singh 1999) can
be captured in our formalism and some of them in a more
intuitive manner. Except for Assign all the other opera-
tions have a direct reading. The idea of assign is to show
that the holder x of the recursive declarative power can ex-
ercise his/her power in two ways. The first conjunct shows
x’s command over y so that y is obliged to realise A. The
second conjunct enables x to transfer to another agent z the
same declarative power x possesses i.e., Assign transfers a
commitment to another creditor within the same context,
and can be performed by the present creditor because it is
authorised.
4 Bringing them all together
Now we will show how the formal representation devel-
oped above can be used to capture the normative depen-
dencies involved in a scenario like the after sales process
model as shown in Figure 1. Consider the part where the
retailer/manufacturer sends notification to the technician.
As noted earlier this may involve an internal activity like
finding the most appropriate technician which in turn de-
pends on certain agreements reached between a particular
technician and the retailer/manufacturer. Let us capture
this scenario using our framework. It should be noted that
in this paper we are interested in the committed depen-
dency between the actors i.e., in a committed dependency
the dependee will try its best to perform the task because
of the fact that the depender would be hurt significantly if
the dependency fails 4. Since in our framework we have
4In an open dependency if the dependency fails the depender would be affected
to some extent whereas a critical dependency indicates that some goal of the de-
pender could not be achieved if the dependency fails. For an overview of this
classification refer to (Yu & Mylopoulos 1993).
a stronger version of committed dependency in the form
of reciprocal obligations (joint commitments) we always
have OyE{x}(X)∧OxE{y}(Y ) denoting the content of the
commitment as was given in (25). In the case of our af-
ter sales service scenario which includes the retailer and a
technician we could state this condition precisely as
OrE{t}performed( j)∧OtE{R}paid(p) (31)
with the reading that the technician t undertakes toward
the retailer r, the obligation to perform the job j, while
the retailer r undertakes towards the technician t, the obli-
gation of paying the price p. Further, a call for pro-
posal (of making a commitment having content X) by
retailer r from any technician t ∈ T can be represented
as proposal{r},{t}(X). In a similar manner offer{t},{r}(X)
conveys technician t’s offer to retailer r with respect to a
commitment having content X and accept{r},{t}(X)means
that the retailer r accepts to a commitment having content
X with technician t.
Suppose that the retailer issues a proposal the terms
of which states the reciprocal obligations of both parties
involved. For instance, the retailers proposal could be that
the technician has an obligation to repair a LG washing
machine (j) and the retailer has the obligation to pay 60
Dollars (p) for it. This could be represented as
proposalTr (E{t}performed( j),Erpaid(p)) (32)
From (3.1) we can arrive at the conclusion that (32)
refers to the retailers proclamation of a specific proposal.
Though this inference is not of much use for this work it
is useful when we think about message passing as a kind
of speech act. The consequence of (32) is that those tech-
nicians who are capable of repairing LG washing machine
can make offers. Suppose that one of the technicians re-
turns an offer which is in the form of a counter-proposal.
offer{t},{r}(E{t}performed( j), paid(p
′)) (33)
where p′ = 50 Dollars. Assume that this is the best offer
the retailer has received and therefore he/she accepts it.
Now the acceptance by the retailer implies his/her agree-
ment because by (29) an offer happens when a proposal
and agreement is already in place. The acceptance by r
could be given as
accept{r},{t}(E{t}performed(t),E{r}paid(p′)) (34)
Using (33) and (34) along with (3.1) gives us
(proc{r,t}(OrE{t}performed(t)∧OtE{r}paid(p′))) (35)
which shows that the parties have made a joint commit-
ment within the context of After Sales Service Processing
(ASSP) scenario. Also because of (7), (35) implies
proc{r,t}(OrE{t}performed(t))∧ proc{r,t}(OtE{r}paid(p′)))
(36)
By applying the rules provided earlier which shows the ef-
fectiveness of a proclamation we can derive from (36) the
conclusion that t is obliged to do the job and r is obliged
to pay for it. Formally this is given as follows
(OrE{t}performed(t)∧OtE{r}paid(p′)) (37)
The above example tells us that agent’s behaviour within
organisations are governed by social rules that impose
obligations over the agents actions. Therefore coordina-
tion in organisations and societies cannot be accounted
for without considering the social laws of the organisa-
tions and the way they constrain behaviours of individ-
ual agents. Hence as a first step to make this view prac-
tically usable in applications it is important to represent
and reason about the obliged behaviours within agents as
we have shown above. This in turn would help to explain
co-ordination among agents as negotiation about obliged
behaviours.
Operation Meaning Representation
Create Instatantiates a commitment proc{x}(OyE{x}A)
Cancel Revokes the commitment proc{x}(¬OyE{x}A)
Release Eliminates the Commitment proc{x}(¬OxE{y}A)∧ proc{x}(¬Ox¬E{y}A)
Delegate Shifts the role of x (debtor) to another proc{x}(procyA)⇒s Ex(procyA)
agent within the same context procx(EyA)⇒s Ex(EyA)
Assign Transfers a commitment to another RecDecPow{x}(OxE{y}A) =
creditor within the same context DeclPow{x}(OxE{y}A)∧
DeclPow{x}(RecDeclPow{z}(OxE{y}A)
Table 1: Operations on commitments
5 Rules for Deontic Dependency
In this section we provide some general rules that takes
care of the deontic constraints to be satisfied between ac-
tors. These rules in turn regulates the agent behaviour in
an organisational set up. A rule stating the deontic con-
straints that need to be satisfied to make a proposal be-
tween a debtor (x) and creditor (y) can be stated as fol-
lows;
IF isDebtor(x)
AND isCreditor(y)
AND (OyE{x}sendGoods(p))
AND (OxE{y}sendMoney(q))
THEN proposal{x},{y}
In a scenario like in (1), we can use the above rule to
represent the constraints related to a proposal of a con-
tract issued by the Retailer. For instance, the retailers
proposal could be that the technician has an obligation
to repairLG washingmachine(q) and the retailer has the
obligation to pay 60 Dollars(p) for it which could be given
in the following way;
IF isRetailer(r)
AND isTechnician(t)
AND (OrE{t}per f ormed(q))
AND (OtE{r}paid(p))
THEN proposal{r},{t}
Similarly, we can give a rule stating the constraints to be
satisfied so that an agreement could be reached between
retailer r and technician t regarding a specific contractual
content as follows;
IF proposal{r},{t}(per f ormed(q), paid(p))
AND proc{t}(OrE{t}per f ormed(q))
THEN agree{t},{r}(per f ormed(q), paid(p))
i.e., in order for the retailer and the technician to come
up with an agreement, initially, there should be a proposal
from the retailer to the technician regarding a specific con-
tractual content and the technician makes a proclamation
through which he obliges himself to bring about the spe-
cific content. It is also possible that the technicain t can
come up with a better offer for the retailer by quoting a
different price p′ for the job to be performed. A rule for
an offer could be given as follows;
IF proposal{t},{r}(OrE{t}per f ormed(q))
AND (OtE{r}paid(p′))
AND agree{r},{t}(per f ormed(q), paid(p′)i)
THEN o f f er{t},{r}
6 Accommodating Deontic Dependencies in i∗
In the previous sections we developed a framework that
provides a normative description of a (business) process
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Figure 2: SD-model for the After Sales Service Scenario
in Figure 1:
in their organisational settings. In this section we show a
dependency diagram similar to i∗ in which we can acco-
modate normative dependency. The i∗ Framework (Yu &
Mylopoulos 1994, Yu & Mylopoulos 1993), (pronounced
i-star and stands for distributed intentionality), is an or-
ganisational modelling technique used by many groups
around the world in their research on early requirements
engineering, business process design, software develop-
ment methodologies and many more. The i∗ approach
enables to describe, model and reason about the goals
of systems (business and socio-technical) that involve
many different actors and for choosing system architec-
tures that best meet these goals. By explicitly modelling
and analysing strategic relationships among multiple ac-
tors the approach incorporates rudimentary social analysis
into a system analysis and design framework. The frame-
work is based on the SD (Strategic Dependency) model
and the SR (Strategic Rationale) model wherein the actors
are related to each other intentionally. Actors depend on
each other for goals to be achieved, tasks to be performed
and resources to be furnished. Whereas SD-model is used
to represent a particular design for a business process the
SR-model describes the reasoning that actors have about
the different possible ways of organising work, i.e, differ-
ent configurations of SD networks. Since our main aim
is to account for a notion of deontic dependency in the i∗
framework we restrict ourselves to the SD-model.
Figure (2) shows a Strategic Dependency model for the
after sales service work-flow in Figure (1). As can be seen
from the figure the SD model consists of a set of nodes
and links. Each node represents an actor, and each link
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After Sales Service Scenario in Figure 1:
between two actors indicates that one actor depends on
the other for something in order that the former may attain
some goal. Four types of dependencies are distinguished
in an SD-model between a depender (the depending ac-
tor) and a dependee (actor who is depended upon). The
object around which the dependency relationship centres
is called the dependum. In a goal-dependency a depender
depends on the dependee to bring about a certain state in
the world wherein the dependee is free to choose how to
accomplish the goal. For instance, in Figure (1), the Re-
tailer/manufacturer depends on the Technician in-order to
perform maintenance. The retailer/manufacturer is only
concerned about the outcome of perform maintenance and
doesn’t care how the technician achieves the goal. An-
other goal dependency in Figure (1) is that of submit main-
tenance report between the retailer/manufacturer and the
technician. Similarly, in a task-dependency, though a de-
pender depends on the dependee to carry out an activity
(the dependum), the activity specification constrains the
choices of the dependee on how the task is to be per-
formed. As an example of task dependency, the Manu-
facturer depends on the Retailer to send notification to
the customer regarding the warranty. This is so because
the Manufacturer wants to have the warranty determined
(limited/extended) according to the well defined instruc-
tions outlined by it. In a resource dependency, the de-
pender depends on the dependee for the availability of an
entity (physical or informational). The dependency be-
tween the Retailer and the Customer to determine war-
ranty type is a resource dependency where the dependum
is a piece of information related to the date on which the
customer purchased the particular product. In asoftgoal
dependency a depender depends on the dependee to bring
about a condition in the world wherein the criteria is not
precisely defined as in the case of hardgoal dependency.
The dependee has a number of ways for achieving the goal
and the depender indicates which combination of choices
would sufficiently meet the desired subgoal. Its usually
considered that a softgoal is satisficed rather than satis-
fied. In Figure (1) promptly submitted report is a soft-
goal dependency between the retailer/manufacturer and
the technician. We will add one more dependency, de-
ontic dependency, to this list as shown in Figure (3) so
that the logical framework provided in the previous sec-
tions can be used to represent and reason about such de-
pendencies. It should be noted that we avoided some re-
lations in Figure (3) which is already explained in Figure
(1) so as not to have the figures cluttered. Send Request
to Technician is a deontic dependency between the re-
tailer/manufacturer and technician because as mentioned
earlier the retailer/manufacturer has the right to choose the
most appropriate technician based on certain agreements
they have reached as a result of mutual obligation. The de-
pendum, i.e., the activity of sending work request cannot
be reduced to any other dependency as it involves obliged
behaviours.
Now we will show how to capture the intentional de-
pendencies of the SD-model using our framework devel-
oped in the previous sections. In the SD-model the ex-
ternal actor relationships as outlined above are charac-
terised in terms of more basic intentional concepts like
belief, goal, ability and commitment. We represent the
intentional dependencies as meta-commitments by us-
ing the notion of reciprocal obligation as follows; Let
us consider a commitment, c = C(x,y,G, p), as given
in (Singh 1999) wherein c is base-level if p does not re-
fer to any other commitment and c is a meta-commitment
if p refers to a base-level commitment. In the case of
i∗ framework, for a goal dependency, the condition p
is an assertion achieve(g) representing the goal g to be
achieved by an agent. For a task dependency on task
t, p is done(t) and for a resource dependency on re-
source r, p is avail(r). In our model we can represent
these dependencies in terms of reciprocal obligation of
the depender towards the dependee to satisfy the condi-
tion p. For instance, in our model, in the case of multi-
lateral proclamations (for example (25), the condition p
(which is the content of the proclamation) is always de-
fined in terms of directed obligations i.e. the satisfac-
tion of condition p is based on reciprocal obligation be-
tween the depender and the dependee. This means the
commitments arrived at by such proclamations are not at
base-level but are meta-commitments since p involves the
obligations of both parties involved which in turn leads
to a joint-commitment. Hence in a way we can say that
in our model we represent an intentional dependency as
a meta-commitment/reciprocal obligation of the depen-
der towards the dependee to create commitments to sat-
isfy condition p. To give an example, suppose that Per-
form Maintenance in Figure(2) is a goal-dependency of
the retailer on the technician. Then this dependency can
be represented as a reciprocal obligation of the technician
towards the retailer through which the technician has an
obligation towards the retailer to create a directed obliga-
tion (upon receiving a request for repair) to achieve the
goal Perform Maintenance. In a similar manner we can
capture the other dependencies in terms of reciprocal obli-
gations.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We showed how a combination of notions related to obli-
gation, proclamation and direct action accounts for a de-
ontic theory of commitment which in turn can be used to
model business processes in their organisational settings.
We first outlined a logical framework, which is based on
a multi-modal logic, to represent the various deontic con-
cepts. A peculiar feature of our logical framework is in
the use of proclamation as a unique speech act that can
model all other speech acts that characterise an organi-
sation. For instance, in most other approaches, what we
modelled as proclamation is represented through differ-
ent types of speech acts (commissives, permissives, agree-
ments, etc.) where each one is characterised by its own
specific semantics. We considered these differences as in-
stances of just one speech act since as far as we are con-
cerned the differences only pertain to the content which
is proclaimed. Then we went on to demonstrate how a
combination of obligation, proclamation and direct action
can account for at-least two types of normative delega-
tion. The most crucial part of this work was developed
next, where it was shown how to achieve normative co-
ordination by imposing social constraints/rules in the form
of mutual obligations among the agents/actors. One con-
sequence of this approach is that it allows agents to talk
to each other based on their sets of obliged behaviours
and thereby have a clean approach to negotiation. An-
other consequence is that by stating them as deontic con-
straints the co-ordination among agents can be seen as an
exchange of deontic constraints. Further, we formalised
the various operations that can be performed on commit-
ments based on the new framework. Finally, we compared
our model with the i∗ framework to show that the various
dependency relationships can be explained in terms of our
work.
An organisational model like ours can be used to cap-
ture, support and enforce social patterns of behaviour of
business processes operating in open environments. Open
societies need mechanisms to systematise, defend and rec-
ommend right and wrong behaviour which in turn can
inspire trust into the agents/process that will join them.
In our model we make use of obligation, commitment
etc. as norms to describe such expected behaviour. Also
our model is rich enough to cover wide range of con-
texts for agent interaction. From a workflow point of
view, recent works (Russel, van der Aalst, ter Hofst-
ede & Edmond 2005) show that there has been a shift
of perspective from Workflow Control Patterns and Work-
flow Data Patterns to that of Workflow Resource Patterns
where modelling of resources (human/non human) and
their interaction is of prime importance. We believe that
our framework can contribute much to support modelling
in the organisational context in which a process operates.
Though we do not address any computational issues
in this paper, work is in progress to develop a computa-
tional framework based on the logical intuitions we have
described here. A computation model based on Defeasible
logic has already been proposed in this regard. Defeasible
logic has been developed by Nute (Nute 1987) with a par-
ticular concern about computational efficiency and devel-
oped over the years by (Maher & Governatori 1999, An-
toniou, Billington, Governatori & Maher 2000). The
reason being ease of implementation (Maher, Rock, An-
toniou, Billignton & Miller 2001), flexibility (Antoniou
et al. 2000) (it has a constructively defined and easy to use
proof theory which allows us to capture a number of dif-
ferent intuitions of non-monotonicity) and it is efficient: it
is possible to compute the complete set of consequences
of a given theory in linear time (Maher 2001). Having
such an inference mechanism allows an agent to deduce
the logical consequences of given obligations as well as
helps in resolving conflicts among obligations (two im-
portant directions in which our work could be extended).
At the moment, we have provided two extensions of stan-
dard Defeasible Logic. The first incorporates the no-
tions of “counts as” and agency, as described in this pa-
per (Governatori & Rotolo 2003, Governatori, Rotolo &
Sadiq 2004). The second combines agency, BDI concepts
and obligations (Governatori & Rotolo 2004). Our future
work will be devoted to developing a unique framework
which is able to deal with the cognitive component (BDI
concepts), agency, and normative notions (“counts as” and
deontic operators).
Before closing down we want to mention some related
works that is of importance to this document. (Gelati
et al. 2004) is the starting point for this work. But the ma-
jor difference is in our use of reciprocal obligations to cap-
ture the commitment aspect involved in agents. Also, we
address our work from a process modelling point of view
whereas (Gelati et al. 2004) is concerned with legal rea-
soning. The same reason applies to (Tan & Thoen 1998).
Two other closely related works are (Taveter & Wagner
2001a, Taveter & Wagner 2001b). In those works too the
concept of mutual obligation is absent as well as they do
not use deontic logic to represent the different normative
concepts. (Yolum & Singh 2004, Singh 1999) provided
some insights to our approach. They represent commit-
ments as first class abstract objects using a four place rela-
tion whereas we show how commitments arise as a result
of the obliged behaviours between the different agents.
(Yu & Mylopoulos 1994) and (Yu & Mylopoulos 1993)
had a major influence on our work and as was shown in the
discussion section our framework can accomodate the var-
ious dependency relationships outlined there. The advan-
tages of having a fifth dependency in the form deontic de-
pendency is worth investigating. (Barbuceanu et al. 1999)
uses obligation, permissions and interdictions (OPIs) to
reason about the behaviour of social agents. OPIs are
modelled by reducing deontic logic to a particular type of
dynamic logic and then constraint satisfaction techniques
are used to infer consequences and solve conflicts among
obligations and interdictions. We believe that this is a
good approach for future work though it will not be pos-
sible to account for many normative relations that are de-
fined in a deontic logical setting by reducing it to some
type of dynamic logic. (Dignum, Va´zquez-Salceda &
Dignum 2004) is another work similar to ours written from
a software engineering perspective.
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